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Some Simulation Results for a 
Green Insurance Mechanism 
Kenneth A. Baerenklau 
This analysis extends previous work on green insurance by proposing a mechanism 
that offers a stronger adoption incentive and is applicable to heterogeneous popu- 
lations and non-binary adoption decisions. Endogenous learning about the new 
technology  is incorporated, and empirically  calibrated  simulation results are presented 
for the case of reduced-phosphorus  dairy diets. Results show that  the mechanism has 
a significant impact on behavior and may incur no net cost for the regulator when an 
insurance premium is charged. Conditions  under which a green payment mechanism 
may be preferable to green insurance also are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Agricultural nonpoint source (NPS) pollution continues to present challenges to local, 
state, and federal regulators. In 1998, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency labeled 
NPS pollution "the greatest remaining source of water quality problems in the United 
States today" (USEPA and USDA, 1998) and identified agricultural sources as the 
largest single class of  existing NPS pollution problems. 
To date, one of the  most effective  methods for reducing agricultural NPS pollution has 
been the  adoption of Best Management Practices (BMPs)  by agricultural producers. But 
because producers often expect BMPs to have undesirable effects on their incomes, 
adoption of BMPs frequently must be encouraged with economic incentives. When the 
incentive takes the  form of a direct subsidy, it commonly is known as a "green payment." 
For a BMP that truly has a negative impact on producer income, pollution reduction can 
be achieved either by using a green payment on a permanent basis or on a temporary 
basis if some type of "lock-in" of the  BMP is expected to occur. For a BMP that producers 
think  will have a negative impact on their incomes, but which regulators are  convinced 
will not, a green payment can be implemented on a temporary basis to encourage 
experimentation  with the  BMP until producers become sufficiently convinced their prior 
beliefs were incorrectand thus prefer the BMP even without a subsidy. 
The latter scenario is unique because it describes the case of  a Pareto-dominant 
production practice: one that reduces pollution without negatively affecting net farm 
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income. While this clearly will not always be the case, advances in scientific knowledge 
and technological progress continue to generate such scenarios for agriculture. Recent 
examples include reduced application of  nitrogen fertilizer (DeVuyst and Ipe, 1999), 
reduced application of  phosphorus fertilizer (USDA, 2002), and reduced-phosphorus 
dairy diets (McGraw, 1999; Wu, Satter, and Sojo, 2000). Successful implementation of 
a voluntary green payment program in cases such as these requires that the subsidy 
compensates producers for their anticipated losses due to adoption of the BMP, regard- 
less of  how pessimistic the producers may be. Therefore, when producers are highly 
skeptical about a proposed BMP, or highly risk averse, total program costs may greatly 
exceed the actual losses incurred by producers. 
To address this issue, DeVuyst and Ipe (DI, 1999)  proposed a "green insurance" mech- 
anism. Green insurance is a type of technology insurance which, like a green payment, 
provides an economic incentive to encourage behavioral change. But whereas the 
payment mechanism must compensate agents  for their anticipated losses, the  insurance 
mechanism compensates them only for their actual losses. Therefore, when prospective 
adopters are  pessimistic about a truly Pareto-dominant  technology,  the  insurance mech- 
anism may be more cost-effective. 
This study extends the  previous work of DeVuyst and Ipe by proposing an  alternative 
green insurance mechanism that offers stronger adoption incentives and is applicable 
to heterogeneous populations and non-binary adoption decisions. Endogenous learning 
about the  new technology is  incorporated, and empirically calibrated simulation results 
are  presented for the case of reduced-phosphorus dairy diets in the state of Wisconsin. 
Results show that the original DI mechanism increases adoption rates only slightly for 
this case, but the modified mechanism has a significant impact on behavior and may 
incur no net cost for the regulator when an  insurance premium is charged. 
Empirical Problem1 
Dairy cows require adequate levels of phosphorus to maintain  high rates of milk produc- 
tion and to avoid reproductive deficiencies. As a consequence, however, these animals 
excrete excess phosphorus into the environment where it causes a variety of problems 
including algal blooms, decreased dissolved oxygen levels, and fish kills (Carpenter et 
al., 1998). Recently, these problems have begun to attract the attention of regulators in 
Wisconsin and other dairy-intensive states  who historically have been more concerned 
with nitrogen runoff (Connors, 2000; Ritchie, 2001). Two related scientific findings also 
have been receiving more attention. First, it  is  well known among animal scientists that 
phosphorus has a threshold effect in dairy cows. Current data suggest when cows are 
fed at  least 3.3-3.8 grams per kilogram of dry matter (g/kg DM), there appear to be no 
negative effects on milk production or pregnancy rates; but both decline quickly when 
phosphorus concentrations drop below this level (Satter, 2000; Wu, Satter, and Sojo, 
2000; Satter  and  Dhiman, 1996).  Second, it  is  well known among Wisconsin agricultural 
extension agents that most of the state's dairy farmers administer phosphorus concen- 
trations in the neighborhood of 4.8 g/kg DM  (McGraw, 1999). On average, this extra 
phosphorus supplement costs farmers $13 per cow each year (Satter, 2000; Satter and 
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Dhiman, 1996).  However, despite the possibility of increasing both environmental 
quality and producer income, most farmers in Wisconsin have not yet begun to adopt 
reduced-phosphorus dairy diets. The goal of this paper is to assess the ability of a green 
insurance mechanism to achieve this result. 
Green Insurance 
As noted previously, green insurance is potentially more cost-effective than green 
payments for the  case of a Pareto-dominant technology. However, two criteria  must 
be met in order to realize these prospective cost savings. First, the regulator must 
be fairly certain that the technology will leave the agent no worse off. If the regu- 
lator is  wrong, and the  technology produces net losses, then the total cost of a green 
insurance  program could be quite large. Second, for individual  insurance contracts, 
there must exist a reliable signal for determining when the new technique has failed 
and to what extent. Otherwise, moral hazard would drive up the actual cost of a green 
insurance program. 
For the  case of reduced-phosphorus dairy diets, animal scientists are  becoming fairly 
convinced that the true phosphorus threshold for dairy cows is between 3.3  and 3.8 gikg 
DM.  So perhaps the first criterion is satisfied. But the second criterion is more 
problematic. Although it is fairly easy to estimate the amount of phosphorus in manure, 
and therefore the amount in feed, it is not feasible to observe all other aspects of milk 
production that  would influence the  two indicators of phosphorus deficiency-milk  yield 
and pregnancy rates. In other words, the opportunity exists for farmers to enroll in a 
green insurance program for reduced-phosphorus dairy diets, reduce their phosphorus 
accordingly, but "shirk" in other aspects of their production process to take advantage 
of this new-found insurance policy. 
In cases such as this where a reliable insurance signal does not exist, it may be 
possible to use a "group incentive" insurance contract instead of individual contracts. 
Similar to "area yield" insurance, this type of mechanism has been addressed in the agri- 
cultural economics literature previously (e.g., Mahul, 1999; Skees, Black, and Barnett, 
1997; Miranda, 1991) as a way to indemnify farmers against production losses due to 
natural events while reducing the moral hazard incentive inherent in an individual 
insurance contract. Under an area yield insurance policy, each producer receives an 
indemnity if the average crop yield over the surrounding geographic area (rather than 
just an individual farm) deviates significantly below some predetermined level. If no 
single farm is large enough to significantly affect this average yield, then each agent's 
dominant strategy is to operate his or her farm in good faith; hence there is no moral 
hazard dilemma. Successful implementation of  such an insurance policy, however, 
requires that producers' yields have strong positive correlation within the designated 
area (i.e., there must be systematic risk). If a farmer's own yield has only weak positive 
correlation with the average yield of the surrounding area, that farmer receives very 
little risk reduction from the insurance, and if  the farmer's yield  has nonpositive 
correlation with that of the surrounding area, then no risk reduction is received.' 
The risk reduction discussed here technically is downside risk reduction. Miranda (1991)  shows that weak positive corre- 
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The green insurance mechanism proposed here is a type of group incentive contract 
which extends the mechanism proposed previously by DeVuyst and Ipe (DI, 1999). The 
indemnity schedule is expressed as: 
where 4, is the per unit indemnity paid in time period t.  The "ma?  term is the original 
DI mechanism, where R denotes average per unit profit; the superscripts P and N 
respectively denote the participant and nonparticipant groups; and the subscripts LR 
and t respectively denote the long-run and time period t profits. The DI mechanism pays 
indemnities to participating farmers only when their profits deviate below (above)  their 
long-run group average more (less) than do the  profits of nonparticipating farmers who 
are subject to the same stochastic shocks (i.e., a control group). 
To understand the role of the "min" term in (I),  consider the problem facing each agent 
when the adoption decision is continuous and the conservation technology is thought 
either to reduce the mean or increase the variance of profits, or both. In the absence of 
any incentive scheme, this (risk-averse) agent will choose some privately optimal adop- 
tion level--call this the agent's baseline level. When the DI mechanism is introduced, 
it establishes new incentives to increase adoption beyond the baseline. Specifically, the 
expected mean profit level everywhere above the baseline is now larger (because a 
strictly positive payment is anticipated), and the expected variance of profits is now 
smaller (because the expected indemnity is negatively correlated with idiosyncratic 
profit shocks). But the incentive is rather weak. To see this, note that payments are 
made uniformly to each agent regardless of  his or her individual extent of  adoption 
(measured relative to the agent's baseline level). Therefore, conditional on all others' 
choices, the optimal action for an agent who believes fbrther adoption is not privately 
beneficial is to increase his or her adoption level only slightly beyond the baseline in 
order to qualify as a "participant," thereby taking advantage of the indemnity created 
by the other agents while minimizing personal exposure to income loss. If all agents 
behave similarly, then the average increase beyond the baseline will be very small and 
the DI mechanism will produce only a minimal change in aggregate beha~ior.~ 
The "min" term in (1)  counteracts this tendency by allowing the incentive to vary with 
the extent of adoption relative to the group average. In this term, qjt  is farmerj's input 
choice in period t;  1150 is farmerj's baseline input level; I, is an indicator function which 
takes a value of 1  only if an agent's input choice qualifies for the incentive program; np 
is the total number of qualifying agents; and a and K are additional parameters chosen 
by the regulator. For the empirical application considered here, if all farmers reduce 
phosphorus by the same amount relative to their baseline levels (as would be the case 
if all adopters were identical), then each receives the same per unit indemnity. Other- 
wise, farmers  who make above-average  reductions receive higher indemnities than those 
There is another potentially important disincentive implicit in both the DI scheme and the mechanism proposed here. 
Because the indemnity is  based on average group profits, it is  not perfectly correlated with any agent's income, and thus there 
is a positive probability that losses due to adoption will not be compensated.  Although the probability of such a false negative 
declines toward zero as the number of members of each group grows larger, this observation  suggests group insurance may 
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who make below-average reductions. This reduces the  free-rider incentive by rewarding 
larger input reductions with larger indemnities. 
This scaling term is bounded in various ways to encourage adoption, discourage un- 
wanted behavior, and prevent undesirable outcomes. First, the indicator function (I,,) 
allows the regulator to limit the range of phosphorus input choices qualifying for the 
incentive program. Agents must reduce their concentrations below their individual 
baseline level (6;)  but not below a lower limit (say, $)in order to qualify. This lower 
limit is analogous to a liability limit in a typical insurance contract and discourages 
agents from choosing arbitrarily low phosphorus levels to take advantage of  the 
incentive program when beliefs about the technology become more closely aligned with 
those of the regulator-after  all, the regulator does not intend to insure agents against 
losses for any phosphorus input choice. Second,  by setting  o > 1,  the  regulator introduces 
curvature into the scaling term that rewards adopters of  relatively low phosphorus 
levels with larger marginal indemnities, thus encouraging these choices and promoting 
faster learning. And third, the regulator can choose a value for K which places an  upper 
limit on the magnitude of  the scaling term. This also serves as a liability limit and 
prevents agents from receiving unreasonably large payments for moderate reductions 
when the average reduction is relatively small. These modifications make the group 
insurance mechanism more akin to an  input-reduction subsidy (i.e., a green payment): 
the "max" term is analogous to the per unit subsidy, and the "minn  term is analogous to 
the total reduction made by each agent; but only actual losses are compensated. 
Adoption Model4 
To determine the impact of the green insurance mechanism in (1)  on the diffusion rate 
of reduced-phosphorus diets, a multi-period adoption model incorporating both risk pref- 
erences and endogenous learning is utilized. To begin, net farm income is modeled as: 
nit  -  = Ki  + xit  p + yit  py + [exp(zity  + yityY  I]".  uit + vt, 
hit 
where the  left-hand side, nitlhit,  is annual net farm income per cow. The first term on the 
right-hand side, K~,  is a farm-specific fmed effect. The second term includes character- 
istics, x,,, which are  thought to affect mean farm income. The third term accounts for the 
technology choice, y,,  and its marginal impact on farm income, p,.  If farm-specific 
phosphorus levels were known, these data would be used as  y,.  However, these data 
currently do not exist. Therefore, an alternative adoption scenario (presented below) is 
used to calibrate the model. 
The model also includes two normal i.i.d. error components. The first, u,,  is a time- and 
farm-specific shock to net farm income that exhibits multiplicative heteroskedasticity. 
Here, zit  is a vector of characteristics thought to influence the  variance of farm income. 
The second term again accounts for the technology choice, y,,  and its marginal impact 
on income variance. The second shock, v,, is a time-specific shock which accounts for 
temporal correlations in  farm profits. This shock is assumed to be distributed N (0,  02). 
Additional details regarding the adoption model can  be found in Baerenklau (2004 and 2005). Baerenklau  Green Insurance Simulations  99 
To obtain a reduced-form adoption model for empirical estimation, assume each 
farmer acts to maximize a nonlinear mean standard deviation utility function (Saha, 
1997; Isik and Khanna, 2003; Baerenklau, 20041, given by: 
Here, a farmer's expected wealth is given by nit  = Wit + E [IT,],  where Wit is the farmer's 
baseline nonrandom wealth level and E[IT,] is expected net farm income. A farmer's 
expected standard deviation of  wealth is given by Zit. This functional form is very 
flexible and accommodates heterogeneity in risk preferences quite easily. Here, one set 
of coefficients [&:,  &:I  is estimated for farmers who have completed a post-high school 
LL  degree program (i.e., higher education) and one set of coefficients [&,,  &,I  is estimated 
for those who have not (i.e., lower education). 
The expectation of farm profit, E[IT,], is taken over two random vectors: [ui,  VI and 
[P,,  yyl. The latter represents farmers7  subjective beliefs about the new technology 
which are assumed to be held commonly and to evolve temporally according to 
Bayes' theorem as  new information about the  technology is revealed in each period. 
Assuming prior beliefs and new information are  both normally distributed, the  posterior 
beliefs also are normally distributed with mean and variance given by (Greene, 1997, 
p. 318): 
2 
7 - 6iyt.  Pyt + upyt.  Dyt 
Pyt+l =  -2  2  7 
t.0  +u 
Pyt  Pyt 
and 
where any quantity denoted by a tilde (-) represents either the new information 
revealed in time period t or its variance. The parameter t is an additional scale factor 
that is needed for the empirical application because estimating the variance of new infor- 
mation is problematic-i.e.,  although the sample permits unbiased estimation of the 
signals received in each period (pyt and yyt),  estimating the noise components (6iytand 
would require knowledge of the effective sample size. Therefore, t accounts for the 
difference between the noise obsemed by the agents and the noise perceived by the 
analyst in each period. 100  April 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Estimation 
Because most Wisconsin dairy farmers have not yet begun to adopt low-phosphorus 
dairy diets, the parameters in equations (2)-(7) are estimated using a calibration 
scenario for which data are available. The calibration scenario examines adoption of 
improved (non-native)  forage varieties by 34 Wisconsin dairy farmers from 1996  to 2000. 
This adoption problem resembles the phosphorus scenario in several important ways: 
the new technology focuses on animal nutrition, it involves no significant fured costs, 
and it is easily reversible. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the same behavioral 
models would apply to each scenario. Furthermore, adoption rates in the calibration 
scenario grew from 11.6%  in 1996 to 29% in 2000 as farmers found this new technology 
to be profitable. This lack of a steady-state adoption level greatly facilitates parameter 
identification in a model with both risk preferences and endogenous learning. 
The adoption model is estimated sequentially.5  First, a maximum-likelihood method 
developed by Griffiths and  Anderson (1982)  is used to obtain consistent estimates for the 
parameters in equation (2). Then the signals in equations (4)-(7) are estimated by 
interacting  y, in equation (2)  with time dummies and rerunning this regression in order 
to allow the  technology to have different observable effects on farm income in each year. 
Given these signals, the remaining nine coefficients in equations (3)-(7) are then esti- 
mated with maximum entropy (Golan,  Judge, and  Miller, 1996).  Details of the  maximum 
entropy method can be found in Baerenklau (2005), but its main advantages are that 
it facilitates incorporation of ex ante information into the estimation and it guarantees 
a solution regardless of whether or not the regression system is identified in the tradi- 
tional sense. Recent applications of this method include Kaplan, Howitt, and Farzin 
(2003); Fernandez (1997); and Golan, Judge, and Karp (1996). 
Variable descriptions and estimation results for equation (2) are given in table 1, 
estimates for the profitability signals are  reported in table 2, and for the risk preference 
parameters in table 3. The estimates for the net farm income function have the 
intuitively correct signs and magnitudes, and overall the significance levels are good. 
The risk preference estimates suggest that agents exhibit increasing absolute and 
relative risk aversion, but the standard errors are too large to reject other forms of risk 
aversion at  the typical significance levels. However, the model predicts sample average 
adoption levels well (see table 4), and  therefore these estimates are  used to calibrate the 
green insurance simulations. 
Calibration 
The simulations assume that  farmers know the  true  impact of improved forage varieties 
on their incomes but are  uncertain about the  phosphorus threshold level. Therefore, the 
coefficients in table 1  are used to simulate profits, and y,P,  and  y,y,  are subsumed by 
5,P and zity  for notational simplicity. Next, equation (2) must be modified slightly, as 
follows: 
Other authors have estimated technology and risk preferences  jointly (e.g., Kumbhakar, 2002; Isik and Khanna, 2003, 
and citations therein), but have omitted endogenous learning. Introducing this factor complicates the estimation problem 
(there are 25 parameters associated with endogenous learning in this model: four initial values, one scale factor, and 20 
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Table 1. Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Net Farm  Income Function (n  = 170) 
Coeff.  Variable Description 
Mean Function: 
p,  Estimated daily farm revenue per cow from milk sales 
(price per pound x pounds produced per cow per day) 
p,  Acres of farmable land per cow 
p,  Acres of pasture per cow 
p,  Percent Holsteins x acres of pasture per cow 
p,  Dummy for use of a computerized record keeping system 
p,  Dummy for use of freestall housing 
p,  Percent of farm assets owned by operator 
p,  Acres of pasture planted with improved grasses per cow 
Variance Function: 
y,  Dummy for farms located in the Southwest region 
y,  Dummy for farms located in the  North Central region 
y,  Dummy for farms located in the East region 
y,  Years of experience as  a dairy farmer 
y,  Pounds of milk produced each day per cow 
y,  Acres of farmable land per cow 
y,  Acres of pasture per cow 
y,  Percent Holsteins x acres of pasture per cow 
y,  Dummy for use of a computerized record keeping system 
y ,,  Dummy for use of freestall housing 
yll  Percent of farm assets owned by operator 





0:  Common variance component  242.531 
Table 2. Estimated Profitability Signals (n  = 170) 
1996  228.085  3,395.159  -0.238  0.644 
1997  89.701  3,267.265  -0.347  0.568 
1998  75.482  6,287.221  1.342  0.385 
1999  235.496  2,431.771  0.193  0.307 
2000  163.989  1,721.005  0.273  0.172 
Notes:  py, and yyt are the signals received in each period;  ci2  and ci2  are the associated variances. 
PYt  7, 
Table 3. Maximum Entropy Estimates for Adoption Model (n  = 170) 
Point  Asymptotic 
Coeff.  Description  Estimate  Std. Error 
a:  Risk coefficient on mean income for higher education level  0.923  0.231 
a:  Risk coefficient on mean income for lower education level  0.838  0.194 
a:  Risk coefficient on standard deviation of income for higher education level  1.244  0.369 
a:  Risk coefficient on standard deviation of income for lower education level  1.092  0.251 102  April 2005  Journal ofAgricultura1 and Resource Economics 
Table 4. Actual and Predicted Annual Mean Adoption Levels in Calibration 
Scenario 
(8)  -  = K~ +xlit(lClit)  P1  + xitP + @it($it)  + C(dit)  + [~xP(z~~Y)]~-  uit + vt. 
hit 
Year  Actual  Predicted 
1996  11.6%  10.8% 
1997  14.9%  15.6% 
1998  21.6%  18.0% 
The first new term involves farm revenue (the first variable in table 1).  In equation (21, 
this term is calculated as: xIit  =pitwit,  where pit  is the price of milk received by agent i in 
time period t,  and wit is the average daily milk production per cow. In equation (81, this 
term (and its associated coefficient)  has been extracted from qtP  to emphasize that  farm 
revenue is now a function of phosphorus concentration, 6,. This function is specified as: 
Year  Actual  Predicted 
1999  23.5%  18.9% 
2000  29.0%  24.4% 
and 
where A($,,  0, 4)  E [O, 11  is a normalized quadratic loss function that depends on the 
phosphorus concentration ($it),  the  threshold level (€I),  and a lower-bound concentration 
(5  < 0). 
Equation (8)  also is augmented with 4,  (I&,),  the  random indemnity payment provided 
by the insurance program as defined in equation (I),  as  well as a term to account for the 
annual cost savings a farmer can earn from reducing the phosphorus concentration fed 
to his or her herd: 
Here, c,  is the annual savings per cow per gikg DM of  phosphorus reduction; c,  is the 
cost to replace a milk cow after a failed pregnancy (to maintain a constant herd size); 
and 6:  is the farmer's initial phosphorus concentration. 
Note, in the absence of any insurance program, equations (8)-(11) specify that phos- 
phorus affects only the first moment of income. When (and if) data become available 
regarding the  impact of phosphorus on the  variance of milk production, the model could 
be extended appropriately. Furthermore, note that the phosphorus-induced declines in 
both milk production and pregnancies are  assumed to be quadratic. The natures of these 
declines are not yet well known, but the quadratic form has several nice properties. 
First, it generates a continuously differentiable function for both milk production and 
pregnancy rates within the relevant range of phosphorus input levels. Second, using a 
higher order exponent tends to shift the  effective threshold level away from (€I),  contrary 
to evidence from the animal science literature. Last, smaller exponents and sigmoid- 
shaped functions did not have significant effects on the simulation results, so the 
quadratic specification is retained. Baerenklau  Green Insurance Simulations  103 
Given these modifications, the optimization problem in equation (3)  is now designated 
by: 
+;  = arg  max [(II,(+,))"  - 
*it 
where Jli; is the optimal phosphorus concentration for agent i at  time t. Compared with 
equation (3),  this expression also differs in terms of its sources of uncertainty. The first 
random vector [ui,  vl is unchanged. But the second now represents agents' beliefs about 
the phosphorus threshold, [el. As before, this belief is assumed to be normally 
distributed and commonly held by all agents, and to evolve through time according to 
Bayes' theorem as  new information about the  true threshold is revealed through agents' 
adoption  decision^.^ 
A third and new source of uncertainty in equation (12) is the indemnity payment. 
Because 4,  is a function of the random profits realized by all producers in time period 
t, it  also is  a random variable that  affects net income. Furthermore, because each agent's 
indemnity payment 4,  is a function of the phosphorus levels chosen by all other agents 
at  time t, determination of  qL',  in  (12)  requires modeling the strategic interactions between 
agents that would be expected to occur in a situation like this. Here, the concept of 
"mutual best response" is employed, requiring solution of a Nash equilibrium in phos- 
phorus decisions in each period. 
Policy Simulations 
In order to incorporate key features of  the low-phosphorus adoption decision and to 
make the simulations tractable, several additional assumptions are needed. First, it is 
assumed that the sample farms in the calibration scenario constitute the participant 
group, and an identical control group (subject to different random income shocks) also 
exists. Second, the true phosphorus threshold is assumed to be 3.5 g/kg DM, but all 
farmers initially believe it is higher. Third, the lower-bound concentration, $ in equa- 
tions (9)-(ll), is assumed to be 1.5 g/kg DM (Valk and ~ebek,  1999; Call et al., 1987). 
Fourth, the annual savings per cow from reducing phosphorus by 1  glkg DM is $10 
(Satter, 2000; Satter and Dhiman, 1996).  And fifth, the cost to replace a milk cow after 
a failed pregnancy is $335 (Wisconsin  Agricultural Statistics Service, 2001). 
The first set of simulations presented here characterizes a baseline scenario without 
any adoption incentive. All simulations are  conducted in GAUSS (Aptech Systems, Inc., 
2003) and employ the built-in pseudo-random number generators. One hundred repeti- 
tions of a 15-year period are simulated with no time trend in profits. A discount factor 
of 0.96 is used to calculate the present value of program costs. Other simulation param- 
eters that characterize this baseline scenario are summarized in table 5. As shown by 
this table, prior beliefs are assumed to have a mean of 4.5 g/kg DM and a variance of 
0.09 in the baseline simulation. No indemnity is offered in the baseline, and therefore 
the parameter values and contract length are  not applicable. The scale parameter adds 
'  A computational  note: equations (4x7)  are derived from Bayes' theorem but are not directly applicable here because 
agents are now learning about a threshold. Therefore, if all new observations during a given time period occur above the 
threshold, the signals used in equations (4x7)  will not be identified. However, direct application  of Bayes' theorem remains 
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Table 5. Simulation Parameters 
Parameter 
Baseline  Insurance 
Scenario  Scenarios 
Initial mean belief about threshold level  4.5 gkg  DM  4.5 gkg  DM 
Measure of initial uncertainty about threshold level 
(variance of initial belief)  0.09  0.09 
Insurance parameter 3  NIA  3.0 g/kg DM 
Insurance parameter a  NIA  1; 2; 3 
Insurance parameter K  NIA  10; 100; 1,000 
Number of years incentive is offered  NIA  10 
Scale parameter for choice disturbances  0.1  0.1 
Note: The parameters v, o,  and K are as defined in the text. 
a small random shock to each agent's optimal choice to simulate the unexplained 
portions of these decisions. 
The baseline scenario in table 5 produces realistic initial phosphorus choices that 
range from a low of 4.26 to a high of 5.24, with an average of  4.73 g/kg DM. Figure 1 
shows the subsequent evolution of the  threshold belief and the  mean choice level for the 
sample farms. Farmers clearly are learning that the true threshold level is below 4.5 
glkg DM, but their rate of learning is relatively slow. By the end of the fifteenth year, 
the annual phosphorus load from the  group of sample farms has been reduced by 5,035 
kg without any adoption incentive.' 
Green Insurance 
Table 5 shows the parameters characterizing three different green insurance scenarios, 
and figure 1  presents the results graphically for the strongest insurance incentive (i.e., 
o = 3 and K = 1,000). The incentive contract has two obvious effects. First, it promotes 
faster learning. From figure 1,  beliefs converge toward the true value of the threshold 
much faster with the  incentive. Second, the incentive promotes lower phosphorus choices 
both during and after the contract window. These expected post-contract choice levels 
and the associated program costs are  of particular interest  to a regulator who must meet 
a mandated load reduction standard within a fured amount of time. By the end of the 
simulations, the  weakest incentive (i.e., o = 1 and K = 10)  achieves an  expected perman- 
ent load reduction of 8,793 kg of phosphorus per year for an expected present value cost 
of $174,082 to the  regulator. The medium incentive (i.e., o = 2 and K = 100) achieves an 
expected annual  load reduction of 11,681  kg of phosphorus for an  expected present value 
cost of $266,107. And the strongest incentive achieves an expected annual load 
reduction of  12,665 kg of phosphorus for an expected present value cost of $367,049. 
These results may be compared with the  load reductions attainable with the  original DI 
insurance mechanism simply by setting o = 0 in the simulations. Not surprisingly, the 
DI mechanism is not as  effective, producing an expected annual load reduction of only 
5,353 kg of phosphorus for an expected present value cost of $222,246. Learning also 
occurs much more slowly with the  original DI mechanism; although not shown in figure 
1, the belief path is nearly indistinguishable from that in the baseline scenario. 
Load reductions are calculated as in Wu, Satter, and Sojo (2000). Baerenklau  Green Insurance Simulations  105 
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3.2  +  Mean Belief (insurance) +  Mean Choice (insurance) 
Time Period 
Figure 1. Evolution of mean threshold belief and mean choice 
level in baseline and insurance scenarios 
It  is also useful to compare the results for the insurance mechanism with analogous 
results for a green payment mechanism. Details of the  payment simulations are  provided 
in Baerenklau (2004), but the basic setup is as follows. Instead of  offering a random 
indemnity which depends on both phosphorus concentration and realized profits, the 
regulator offers a certain payment which depends only on phosphorus concentration. 
The payment takes the form of a uniform input reduction subsidy-it  is uniform in the 
sense that each farmer receives the same per unit payment for phosphorus reductions, 
but each farmer's total payment depends on his or her total reduction. Total program 
costs are calculated as  they are here. 
Results of this comparison are twofold. First, a green payment mechanism tends to 
incur greater costs for an  equivalent load reduction. For example, a 10-year  contract for 
a uniform input reduction subsidy can achieve an expected permanent load reduction 
of  12,802 kg of phosphorus per year for an expected present value cost of  $1,453,624 
(versus 12,665  kg and  $367,049 for the strongest insurance mechanism examined here). 
Second,  green payments appear  better suited for situations  where relatively large andlor 
fast load reductions are desired. For example, a five-year contract for a uniform input 
reduction subsidy can achieve an expected annual load reduction of  16,247 kg of phos- 
phorus for an  expected cost of $3,952,931, but it  is  not possible to achieve a similar load 
reduction with a green insurance mechanism.' 
Finally, it should be noted that the insurance coverage in these simulations is 
provided to farmers  for free; there is no insurance premium. Charging a premium would 
decrease program costs further because it creates a source of revenue for the regulator 
'Additional simulations show evidence of rapidly diminishing returns for the insurance mechanism. The additional incen- 
tive provided by using o > 3 and K > 1,000 has very little effect on the learning and adoption paths, but program costs 
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Figure 2. Farmer willingness to pay for one year of insurance 
coverage at program outset 
and tends to reduce program enrollment (and thus total indemnity payments), but it 
also would increase the expected pollutant load during the program because the 
uninsured farmers would not reduce their input levels as much as if they were insured. 
However, provided both insured and uninsured farmers are part of the same informa- 
tion network (as they are  in these simulations), post-contract pollutant loadings may be 
similar to those achievable with complete enrollment because the uninsured farmers 
will still learn about the true threshold level through time. 
To explore the  possibility of charging a premium, farmer  willingness to pay (WTP)  for 
one year of insurance coverage during the first year of the program is calculated for the 
strongest insurance mechani~m.~  WTPvalues range from a high of $307 per cow to a low 
of $4 per cow with a mean of $68 per cow. Figure 2 presents these results graphically, 
sorted from highest to lowest WTP. Clearly, chargingmore than a nominal premium will 
cause many farmers to exit the program. For example, half of  the 34 farmers would 
choose not to enroll if the premium were only $26 per cow. 
To examine the impact of a premium on post-contract pollutant levels, the strongest 
insurance mechanism is simulated with a premium of  $26 per cow. This approach 
achieves an expected annual load reduction of  12,150 kg and the regulator actually 
earns a present value profit of $158,227. Clearly, if the regulator is primarily concerned 
with the long-run pollutant load, this approach is  very cost-effective. By pricing the 
insurance coverage, the  regulator can target the  mechanism at  a subset of polluters, 
a tactic more difficult to accomplish with a voluntary payment program. Provided 
farmers who choose not to enroll still receive the information generated by the 
enrolled farmers and believe them to be a reliable source of  information, total 
program costs can be significantly reduced with only minor increases in long-run 
pollutant loadings. 
I thank a reviewer for suggesting these calculations. Green Insurance Simulations  107 
Summary and Conclusion 
The simulation results presented here are  based on a decision-theoretic model of rational 
choice under uncertainty which incorporates both risk preferences and endogenous 
learning. Because data are  unavailable for direct estimation of the relevant parameters, 
the model is calibrated using a structurally similar adoption decision faced by the 
sample population. The model calibration results generally are good and suggest that 
both risk aversion and subjective beliefs are important behavioral determinants. 
The simulation results reveal that a green insurance mechanism can accelerate 
learning and produce significant,  permanent changes in behavior for a reasonable cost. 
Although the simulations support ex ante reasoning that pollutant load reductions can 
be achieved more cost-effectively  with green insurance than with green payments when 
subjective beliefs are limiting adoption, the insurance mechanism appears inadequate 
for producing relatively large load reductions over relatively short time horizons. There- 
fore, if significant and rapid behavioral changes are desired, a payment mechanism may 
be preferable. 
Furthermore, implementing  green insurance requires that an adequate control group 
be available and willing to participate. These simulations implicitly assume such a 
group exists and its members are willing to provide the necessary information without 
compensation due to the value they place on the information generated by the program 
participants. To  the extent a regulator must compensate the control group, or to the 
extent a regulator incurs other information collection costs, total program costs would 
increase. Therefore, if an adequate control cannot be found or if information costs are 
relatively large, a payment mechanism again may be preferable. 
Additional work on green insurance should consider the theoretical properties of the 
group incentive mechanism. While the mechanism described here may be comparatively 
simple and practical, it is not necessarily optimal. In other words, it may be possible to 
derive a green insurance mechanism that provides an even stronger adoption incentive 
without incurring significant  additional costs. Such a mechanism clearly would be bene- 
ficial for regulators faced with tight budgets and persistent agricultural NPS pollution 
problems. 
[Received  July 2003;Jinal revision received November 2004.1 
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